Abadi has introduced a logic to explicate the meaning of local names in SDSI, the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure proposed by Rivest and Lampson. Abadi's logic does not correspond precisely to SDSI, however; it draws conclusions about local names that do not follow from SDSI's name resolution algorithm. Moreover, its semantics is somewhat unintuitive. This paper presents the Logic of Local Name Containment, which does not suffer from these deficiencies. It has a clear semantics and provides a tight characterization of SDSI name resolution. The semantics is shown to be closely related to that of logic programs, leading to an approach to the efficient implementation of queries concerning local names. A complete axiomatization of the logic is also provided.
Introduction
Rivest and Lampson [12] introduced SDSI-a Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure-to facilitate the construction of secure systems. In SDSI, principals (agents) are identified with public keys. In addition to principals, SDSI allows other names, such as poker-buddies. Rather than having a global name space, these names are interpreted locally, by each principal. That is, each principal associates with each name a set of principals. Of course, the interpretation of a name such as poker-buddies may be different for each agent. However, a principal can "export" his bindings to other principals. Thus, Ron may receive a message from the principal he names Joe describing a set of principals Joe associates with poker-buddies. Ron This work was supported in part by NSF under grant IRI-96-25901 and by a UTS internal research grant. may then refer to this set of principals by the expression Joe's poker-buddies.
Rivest and Lampson [12] give an operational account of local names; they provide a name-resolution algorithm that, given a principal k and a name n, computes the set of principals associated with n according to k. Abadi [1] has provided a logic that, among other things, gives a more semantic account of local names. According to Abadi, its purpose "is to explain local names in a general, self-contained way, without requiring reference to particular implementations." Abadi shows that the SDSI name-resolution algorithm can be captured in terms of a collection of sound proof rules in his logic.
Abadi's focus is on axioms. He constructs a semantics, not with the goal of capturing the intended meaning of his constructs, but rather, with the goal of showing that certain formulas are not derivable from his axioms. (In particular, he shows that false is not derivable, showing that his axioms are consistent.) While adequate for Abadi's restricted goals, his semantics validates some formulas that we certainly would not expect to be valid. One consequence of this is that, while he is able to pinpoint some potential concerns with the logic, the resolution of these concerns is less satisfactory. For example, he observes that adding two seemingly reasonable axioms to his logic allows us to reach quite an unreasonable conclusion. However, it is not obvious from the semantic intuitions provided by Abadi which (if either) of the axioms is unreasonable, or why it is unreasonable. Moreover, while he proves that this particular unreasonable conclusion is not derivable in his framework, as we show, a closely related (and equally unreasonable) conclusion is in fact valid. This means we have no assurance that it or other similar formulas cannot be derived from Abadi's axioms.
We very much subscribe to Abadi's goal of using a logic to give a general account of naming. In this paper, we pro-vide a logic whose syntax is very similar to Abadi's, but whose semantics is quite different and, we believe, captures better the meaning we intend the constructs to have. Nevertheless, all but one of Abadi's name space axioms are sound in our system.
We remark that, in a sense, our task is much easier than Abadi's, since we give the constructs in the logic a somewhat narrower reading than he does. Abadi tends to intertwine and occasionally identify issues of naming with issues of rights and delegation. (Such an identification is also implicitly made to some extent in designs such as PolicyMaker [4] .) We believe that it is important to treat these issues separately. Such a separation allows us to both give a cleaner semantics for each of the relevant notions and to clarify a number of subtleties. This paper focuses on naming, which we carefully separate from the other issues; a companion paper [8] considers authority and delegation.
We believe that our approach has a number of significant advantages:
We can still simulate the SDSI's name resolution algorithm; Abadi's extra axiom is unnecessary. In fact, our logic captures SDSI's name resolution more accurately than Abadi's. Abadi's logic can draw conclusions that SDSI's name resolution cannot; our logic, in a precise sense, draws exactly the same conclusions as SDSI's name resolution algorithm.
According to our semantic intuition, one of Abadi's proposed additional axioms is in fact quite unreasonable; it does not hold under our semantics, and it is quite clear why.
We are able to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of our logic. Thus, unlike Abadi, we have a proof system that corresponds precisely to our semantics. This will allow us to prove stronger results than Abadi's about formulas that cannot be derived in our framework.
Our logic is closely related to Logic Programming. This allows us to translate queries about names to Logic Programming queries, and thus use all the welldeveloped Logic Programming technology to deal with such queries.
Our approach opens the road to a number of generalizations, which allow us to deal with issues like permission, authority, and delegation [8] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Abadi's logic and, in the process, describe SDSI's naming scheme. We also point out what we see as the problems with Abadi's approach. In Section 3, we give the syntax and semantics of our logic, and present a complete axiomatization. In Section 4 we show that our logic provides a tight characterization of SDSI name resolution. Section 5 deals with the connection between our account of SDSI name resolution and logic programming, and Section 6 concerns Self, an additional construct considered by Abadi. Section 7 concludes.
SDSI's Name Spaces and Abadi's Logic
In this section, we briefly review SDSI's naming scheme and Abadi's logic, and discuss our criticism of Abadi's logic. Like Abadi, we are basing our discussion on SDSI 1.1 [12] .
SDSI's Name Spaces
SDSI has local names and a set of reserved names, which we refer to as global names. Both are associated with sets of principals, but the set of principals associated with a local name depends on the principal, while the set of principals associated with a global name does not. We denote the set of global names by G with generic element g, the set of local names by N with generic element n, and the set of keys (principals) by K with generic element k. We assume that all these sets are pairwise disjoint. Global identifiers are either keys or global names. 1 The elements of K G N are said to be simple names. We form principal expressions from simple names inductively: Simple names are principal expressions, and if p 1 ; : : : ; p m are principal expressions, then so is ref :p 1 ; : : : ; p m , which is more typically written as p 1 's : : : p m,1 's p m . 2 Abadi's semantics (and ours) makes ref associative, in that (p's q's r, p's q's r, and p's q's r are all the same. In light of this, we can ignore parenthesization when writing such expressions. We remark for future reference that SDSI has a special global name denoted "DNS!!", which represents the root of the DNS (Internet mail) hierarchy; this allows us to express an email address such as bob@fudge.com as DNS!!'s com's fudge's bob.
SDSI allows a principal to issue certificates of the form n 7 ,! p, signed with its key. If k issues such a certificate, it has the effect of binding local name n in k's name space to the principals denoted by the principal expression p. 3 Notice that only principals issue certificates, and that these certificates bind a local name (not a global name) to some set of principals. In general, a local name may be bound to a unique principal, no principal, or many principals. SDSI allows a principal k to issue certificates n 7 ,! p 1 and n 7 ,! 1 Note that Abadi uses G for global identifier; thus, his G corresponds to our G K.
2 Like Abadi, we allow m to be 0, taking (ref:) to be the current principal. In Section 6, we follow Abadi by considering an expression
Self that represents (ref:). p 2 . This has the effect of binding n to (at least) the principals denoted by p 1 and p 2 . SDSI provides a name-resolution algorithm for computing the set of names bound to a principal. The core of the algorithm consists of a nondeterministic procedure REF2. For ease of exposition, we take REF2 to have four arguments: a principal k, a function c that associates with each principal k 0 a set of bindings (intuitively, ones that correspond to certificates signed by k 0 ), a function which associates with each global name g a set of principals (intuitively, the ones bound to g), and a principal expression p. REF2(k, ,c,p) returns the principal(s) bound to p in k's name space, given the bindings and the certificates c. REF2 is nondeterministic; the set of possible outputs of REF2 is taken to be the set of principals bound to p in k's name space. REF2 is described in Figure 1 
Abadi's Logic: Syntax, Semantics, and Axiomatization
The formulas in Abadi's logic are formed by starting with a set of primitive propositions and formulas of the form p 7 ,! p 0 , where p and p 0 are principal expressions.
More complicated formulas are formed by closing off under conjunction, negation, and formulas of the form p says , where is a formula.
Abadi views p 7 ,! p 0 as meaning that p is "bound to" p 0 . He considers two possible interpretations of "bound to". The first is equality; however, he rejects this as being inappropriate. (In particular, it does not satisfy some of his axioms.) The second is that p 7 ,! p 0 means p 0 "speaksfor" p, in the sense discussed in [2, 11] . Roughly speaking, this says that any message certified by p 0 should be viewed as also having been certified by p. While the "speakingfor" interpretation is the one favored by Abadi, he does not commit to it. Note that under Abadi's "speaking-for" interpretation, it makes sense to write p 7 ,! p 0 for arbitrary principal expressions p and p 0 . However, SDSI allows only local (simple) names to be bound to principal expressions. 4 Our version of REF2 is similar, although not identical, to Abadi's. Like Abadi's, it is simpler than that in [12] , in that we do not deal with a number of issues, such as quoting or encrypted objects, dealt with by SDSI. Our presentation of REF2 differs from Abadi's mainly in its treatment of global names. Abadi assumes that REF2 takes only two arguments, o and p, where o is either a global identifier (i.e., an element of G K) or current principal, denoted cp. Although he does not write c explicitly as an argument, he does assume that there is a set he denotes assumptions(o) that includes bindings corresponding to signed certificates. In addition, it includes bindings for cp. We do not have a distinguished current principal; rather, if the current principal is k, then for uniformity we assume that all of the current principal's bindings are also described by the bindings in ck. More significantly, if g is a global name, then Abadi's REF2(o,g) would return g, while ours would return some principal k to which g is bound in . Our approach seems more consistent with the SDSI presentation of REF2, but this difference is minor, and all of Abadi's results hold for our presentation of REF2.
We shall make a similar restriction in our logic (and, indeed, under our semantic interpretation of binding, it would not make sense to allow an arbitrary principal expression to be bound to another one.)
The "speaks-for" interpretation intertwines issues of delegation with those of naming. As we suggested in the introduction, we believe these issues should be separated. We shall give 7 ,! a different interpretation that we believe is simpler and more in the spirit of binding. We believe that the "speaks-for" relation of [2, 11] should have quite different semantics than that of binding names to principals. (We hope to return to this issue in future work.) Abadi interprets p says as "the principal denoted by p makes a statement that implies ". In the case where p is a key (i.e., principal) k, this could mean that k signs a statement saying . Under our more restrictive interpretation, this is exactly how we interpret our analogue to says.
In any case, note that Abadi translates SDSI's local name n being bound to p as n 7 ,! p and captures k signing a certificate saying n is bound to p by the formula k says n 7 ,! p. For future reference, it is worth noting that, in order to capture the binding of names to principals, no use is made of primitive propositions.
Abadi's interprets formulas in his logic with respect to a tuple W ; ; ; . The function maps global identifiers (G K) to subsets of W. The function maps N W to subsets of W. Finally, associates with each world (principal) k and primitive proposition p a truth value p; k.
Abadi does not provide any intuition for his semantics, but suggests that W should be thought of as a set of possible worlds, as in modal logic. However, he also suggests [private communication, 1999] that his semantics was motivated by the work of Grove and Halpern [7] , in which the corresponding set contains pairs consisting of a world and an agent. Some of Abadi's definitions make more intuitive sense if we think of W as a set of agents, while others make more sense if we think of W as a set of worlds. We elaborate on this point below.
Given k 2 W and p 2 P , Abadi defines p k inductively, as follows:
Here we have used a notation corresponding to the interpretation of the "worlds" in W as agents. Using this interpretation we may think of p k as the set of principals bound to principal expression p according to k. The clause for p 1 's p 2 k then says that if k 0 is one of the principals referred to by k as p 1 , then k uses p 1 's p 2 to refer to any principal referred to by k 0 as p 2 .
REF2(k, ,c,p)
if p 2 K then return(p) else if p 2 G then if p = ; then fail else return(k 0 ) for some k 0 2 p else if p is a local name n in N then if ck = ; then fail else for some n 7 ,! q 2 ck return(REF2(k, ,c,q)) else if p is of the form q's r then return(REF2(REF2(k, ,c,q), ,c,r))
Abadi also defines what it means for a formula to be true at world k 2 W , written k j = , inductively, by k j = p iff p; k = true, if p is a primitive proposition k j = ^ iff k j = and k j = k j = : iff k 6 j = k j = p 7 ,! p 0 iff p k p 0 k k j = p says iff k 0 j = for all k 0 2 p k . These clauses defining j = are quite intuitive if one interprets W to be a set of worlds and considers p k to be the set of worlds consistent with what principal p has said at world k. In particular, under this interpretation, the clause for says can be read as stating that p says if holds in all worlds consistent with what p has said. The clause for 7 ,! also has quite a plausible reading under the "speaks-for" interpretation of this construct: it states that p 0 speaks for p if all worlds consistent with what p has said are consistent with what p 0 has said, i.e., p is constrained to speak consistently with what p 0 has said. However, it seems rather difficult to extend this intuitive reading to encompass the inductive definition of p k . In particular, it is far from clear to us what intuitive understanding to assign to the clause for p 1 's p 2 k on this reading.
On the other hand, note that if we interpret the worlds as agents, then we can think of k j = as saying that is true when local names are interpreted according to agent k. But this reading of the clauses, when combined with the intuitive reading of p k as the set of principals that k refers to using p, also has its difficulties. Intuitively, when n is bound to p in principal k's local name space, the principals that k refers to using p should be a subset of the principals that k refers to using n. Abadi interprets n being bound to p as n 7 ,! p, this holds with respect to principal k when p k is a superset of n k . This is precisely the opposite of what we would expect. Thus, neither the interpretation of W as a set of worlds nor the interpretation of W as a set of agents gives a fully satisfactory justification for Abadi's semantics. As we shall see, in our semantics, the interpretation of a principal expression p according to an agent will be a set of agents, but we use the reverse of Abadi's containment to represent binding.
Abadi provides an axiom system for his logic, which has three components:
1. The standard axioms and rules of propositional logic.
2. The standard axiom and rule for modal logic for the says operator: p says p says p says p says 3. New axioms dealing with linked local name spaces, shown in Figure 2 .
He shows that this axiomatization is sound, but conjectures it is not complete.
Name Resolution in Abadi's Logic
Abadi proves a number of interesting results relating his logic to SDSI. First, he shows that in a precise sense his logic can simulate REF2. He provides a collection of nameresolution rules NR (which we present in the full paper [10] ) and proves the following results: These results show that any bindings of names to principals that can be deduced using REF2 can also be deduced using Abadi's logic. However, Abadi shows that his logic is actually more powerful than REF2, by giving two examples of conclusions that can be deduced from his logic but not using REF2: k says Lampson In reference to Example 2.3, Abadi [1] says that "it is not clear whether [these conclusions] are harmful, and they might in fact be useful". In general, he views it as a feature of his logic that it allows reasoning about names without knowing their bindings [private communication, 1999]. While we agree that, in general, reasoning about names without knowing their bindings is a powerful feature, we believe it is important to make clear exactly which conclusions are desirable and which are not. This is what a good semantics can provide. Under our semantics, neither of these two conclusions are valid. In fact, our logic draws precisely the same conclusions as REF2. Of course, the conclusions of Examples 2.3 and 2.4 are valid under Abadi's semantics but, as we observed earlier, Abadi's semantics is not really meant to be used as a guide to which conclusions are acceptable (and, indeed, as we shall see, it validates a number of conclusions that do not seem so acceptable).
Abadi also considers the effect of extending his axiom system. In particular, he considers adding the following two axioms: the converse of Globality: g 7 ,! p's g a generalization of Linking: p says p 1 7 ,! p 2 p's p 1 7 ,! p's p 2 , for an arbitrary principal p.
The generalization of Linking is in fact sound under Abadi's semantics. The converse of Globality is not, but only because we may have p k = ;. Note that p k = ; iff k j = p says false; thus, the following variant of the converse of Globability is sound under Abadi's semantics:
:p says false g 7 ,! p's g. This is quite relevant to our purposes because Abadi shows that if we added the two axioms above to his system, then from k says DNS!! 7 ,! k, we can conclude DNS!! 7 ,! k. Thus, just from k saying that DNS!! is bound to k, it follows that DNS!! is indeed bound to k. This is particularly disconcerting under Abadi's "speaks-for" interpretation, where DNS!! 7 ,! k becomes "k speaks for DNS!!".
We certainly do not want an arbitrary principal to speak for the name server! Abadi proves a result showing that such conclusions are not derivable from hypotheses of a certain type in his logic (which does not have these two axioms).
Proposition 2.5: [1]
Let k and k 0 be distinct global names; let be a formula of the form k 0 says n 1 7 ,! p 1 :
: : k 0 says n k 7 ,! p k , where n 1 ; : : : ; n k are local names and p 1 ; : : : ; p k are principal expressions; let be a formula of the form k says 1 ^: : : k says m , where 1 ; : : : ; m are arbitrary formulas. Then ^ k 0 7 ,! k is not valid. 6 While Proposition 2.5 provides some assurance that undesirable formulas are not derivable in the logic, it does not provide much. Indeed, if we allow the to include the formula :k 0 says false, then the result no longer holds. In fact, it follows from our earlier discussion that the formula k says DNS!! 7 ,! k: k says false DNS!! 7 ,! k is valid. Moreover, it does not seem so unreasonable to allow conjuncts such as :k says false as part of . We certainly want to be able to use the logic to be able to say that if a principal's statements are not blatantly inconsistent, then certain conclusions follow.
The Logic of Local Name Containment
In this section we propose the Logic of Local Name Containment (henceforth LLNC) as an alternative to Abadi's logic. LLNC interprets local names as sets of principals and interprets SDSI certificates as stating containment relationships between these sets. We define the syntax in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we describe two distinct semantics for the logic. Section 3.3 presents a complete axiomatization.
Syntax
LLNC has syntactic elements that are closely related to the syntactic elements of Abadi's logic. However, our notation differs slightly from Abadi's to help emphasize some of the differences in intuition.
Again, we start with keys K, global names G, and local names N, and form principal expressions from them. For technical reasons, we make the (quite reasonable) assumption that K is a finite set. The formulas of our language are formed as follows:
If p and q are principal expressions then p 7 ,! q is a formula.
If k 2 K and is a formula then k cert is a formula. If 1 and 2 are formulas, then so are : 1 and 1^ 2 . As usual, 1 _ 2 is an abbreviation for :: 1: 2 and 1 2 is an abbreviation for : 1 _ 2 . We write L for the set of all formulas. (For simplicity, we omit primitive propositions, although we could easily add them. They play no role in Abadi's account of SDSI names, nor will they in ours.)
We read the expression p 7 ,! q as "p contains q"; we intend for it to capture the fact that all the keys bound to q are also bound to p. However, our intuitions about the meaning of p 7 ,! q are quite different from Abadi's. In particular, we do not wish to interpret p 7 ,! q as "q speaks for p." We consider the "speaks for" relation as being about rights and delegation, which requires a more sophisticated semantics than we wish to consider here. (See [8] for a logic for reasoning about rights and delegation.) The expression p 7 ,! q should be understood as simply asserting a containment relationship between the denotations of principal expressions p and q; this is exactly what our semantics will enforce.
We read the expression k cert as "k has certified that ." This corresponds roughly to Abadi's k says . There are two significant differences, however. For one thing, we do not allow arbritrary principal expressions on the lefthand side; only keys may certify a formula . For another, our interpretation of cert is more restrictive than Abadi's says, in that cert is treated quite syntactically; it refers to an actual certificate issued by a principal, while says considers logical consequences of such certificates. As a consequence, whereas says satisfies standard properties of modal operators (e.g., closure under logical consequence), cert does not.
Semantics
Our semantics is designed to model the SDSI principle that principals bind names in their local name space to values by issuing certificates. The interpretation of a local name depends on the principal and the certificates that have been issued. As the principal may rely on others for its interpretation of local names, the certificates issued by other principals also play a role. The interpretation of global names and keys will be independent of both the principal and the certificates that have been issued.
A world is a pair w = ;c , where : G ! P K and c : K ! P n L, where PX (resp., P n X ) denotes the set of subsets (resp., finite subsets) of X. Intuitively, the function interprets global (or fixed) names as sets of keys. The intended interpretation of the function c is that it associates with every key k the set of formulas ck that have been certified using this key. That is, if 2 ck then, intuitively, a certificate asserting has been signed using k. 7 Formulas of the logic will be interpreted in a world with respect to a key. Intuitively, this key indicates the principal from whose perspective we interpret principal expressions.
To interpret local names, we introduce an additional semantic construct. A local name assigment will be a function l : K N ! P K associating each key and local name with a set of keys. Intuitively, lk; n is the set of keys represented by principal k's local name n. We write LNA for the set of all local name assignments.
Given a world w = ;c , a local name assignment l, and a key k, we may assign to each principal expression p an interpretation p w;l;k , a set of keys. The definition is much like that of Abadi's p k : k 0 w;l;k = fk 0 g, if k 0 2 K is a key, g w;l;k = g, if g 2 G is a global name, n w;l;k = lk; n, if n 2 N is a local name, p's q w;l;k = S f q w;l;k 0 j k 0 2 p w;l;k g, for principal expressions p; q 2 P .
We now define what it means for a formula to be true at a world w = ;c with respect to a local name assignment l and key k, written w;l;k j = , by induction on the structure of . 8 w;l;k j = p 7 ,! q if p w;l;k q w;l;k w;l;k j = k 0 cert if 2 ck 0 w;l;k j = : 1 if not w;l;k j = 1 w;l;k j = 1^ 2 if w;l;k j = 1 and w;l;k j = 2 . Note that the semantics of cert reinforces its syntactic nature. To determine if k 0 cert is true at w;l;k, we check whether a certificate has been issued in world w by k 0 certifying . Moreover, as we shall see, while we allow any formula to be certified by k, the only formulas whose certification has a nontrivial semantic impact are those of the form n 7 ,! p, where n is a local name. We return to this issue below.
We do not consider all pairs w;las being appropriate on the left-hand side of j =. If w = ;c , we expect the local name assignment l to respect the certificates that have been issued in c. That is, if ck includes the binding n 7 ,! p, we would expect that lk; n would include all the keys bound 7 We make the simplifying assumption that certificates do not have expiration dates. It is not difficult to extend the logic to take into account certificate expiration. 8 Note that our semantics is thus in the spirit of that of Grove and Halpern [7] , in that the truth of a formula depends on both an agent and some features of the world (captured by w and l).
to p in k's name space. The question is whether there can be other keys bound to n in k's name space beyond those forced by the certificates. How we answer this question depends on our intuitions for c. For example, we could view c as the set of certificates received by one of the principals. This would be particularly appropriate if we wanted to reason about the knowledge and belief of the agents, an extension we plan to explore in future work. With this viewpoint, we could view l as consisting of all the bindings, including ones that the principal does not know about. Thus, l would at least have all the bindings forced by c, but perhaps others as well. Alternatively, we could view c as consisting of all the certificates that have been issued. In this case, we would want l to be in some sense minimal, and have no bindings beyond those forced by the certificates in c. We now present two different semantics, which reflect each of these two intuitions. We then show that, as far as validity is concerned, the semantics are equivalent; that is, they have the same proof theory.
A local name assignment l is consistent with a world w = ;c if, for all keys k, local names n, and principal expressions p, if the formula n 7 ,! p is in ck, then w;l;k j = n 7 ,! p. Intuitively, assignments that are not consistent with a world provide an inappropriate basis for the interpretation of local names, since the certificates issued by principals are not necessarily reflected in their local bindings. We obtain our first semantics, called the open semantics, by restricting to consistent local name assignments. Although our syntax allows k to certify arbitrary formulas, it is easy to see that, according to the semantics just introduced (as well as the one we are about to introduce), only the certification of formulas of the form n 7 ,! p has any impact on consistency; all other formulas certified by k are ignored. There is a good reason for this restriction. We are implicitly assuming that when k 0 certifies n 7 ,! p, that very act causes all the keys bound to p to also be bound to However, once we allow more general Boolean combinations (in particular, once we allow disjunctions), there will be problems making sense out of the intuition of our next semantics, that "no bindings beyond those forced by the certificates in c". We consider this issue next.
According to the open semantics, it is possible for a local name n of principal k 1 to be bound to a key k 2 even when no certificate concerning n has been issued. Arguably, this is not in accordance with the intentions of SDSI. To better capture these intentions, we define a second semantics, that restricts the name bindings to those forced by the certificates issued.
To do so, we first establish that the open semantics satisfies a kind of "minimal model" result. Define the ordering on the space LNA of local name assignments by l 1 l 2 if l 1 k; n l 2 k; n for all k 2 K and n 2 N. It is readily seen that LNA is given the structure of a complete lattice [3] by this relation. Say that a local name assignment l is minimal in a set of local name assignments L if l 2 L and l l 0 for all l 0 2 L. The proof of this result (which, like that of all the other theorems in this extended abstract, can be found in the full paper [10] ) uses standard techniques from the theory of fixed points.
We now define our second semantics, called the closed semantics. It attempts to capture the intuition that the only bindings in l should be those required by the certificates in c, using the minimal assignment promised by Theorem 3.1.
We write w;k j = c if w;l w ; k j = . We say that is c-satisfiable if there exists a world w and key k such that w;k j = c and that is c-valid, denoted j = c , if w;k j = c for all worlds w and principals k. Note that by Theorem 3.1, the assignment l w is consistent with w, so c-satisfiability implies o-satisfiability. Thus, if j = o then j = c . As the following result shows, somewhat surprisingly, the converse holds as well. i.e., for all formulas , we have j = o iff j = c .
A Complete Axiomatization
Theorem 3.2 shows that the same formulas are o-valid and c-valid. Thus, both the open semantics and the closed semantics can be characterized by the same axiomatization, which is described in Figure 3 . It is interesting to compare our axioms to Abadi's. Although we interpret 7 ,! as superset and he interprets it as subset, Reflexivity, Transitivity, Left-Monotonicity, and Associativity, hold in both cases, for essentially the same reasons. The switch from subset to superset means that the Converse of Globality holds in our case. Globality does not hold in general because the denotation of p's g may be empty if the denotation of p is empty (as we observed, this is also why the Converse of Globality does not hold in general for Abadi). In fact, for our logic, p's g 7 ,! g whenever the denotation of p is nonempty. Key Globality is a special case of this, and it turns out to be all we need for completeness. 9 Key Linking is our analogue of Abadi's Linking axiom.
Of course, we use cert whereas Abadi uses says; in addition, only keys can certify formulas for us. While this axiom shows that there are some similarities between cert and says, there are some significant differences. We have no analogue of Abadi's Speaking-for axiom and, unlike says, cert does not satisfy the standard axiom and rule of modal logic: k cert ^k cert does not imply k cert and k cert is not valid even if is valid. Interestingly, Abadi does not use these properties of Speaking-for in proving that his name resolution rules NR, used to capture REF2, are sound. As a result, (with very minor changes) we can show that the name resolution rules are also sound for LLNC, and hence we can prove analogues of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. However, we can actually prove a much stronger result: whereas Abadi's logic is able to draw conclusions about bindings that do not follow from REF2, LLNC captures REF2 exactly (see Theorem 4.1).
We have two axioms that do not appear in Abadi's axiomatization: Key-Distinctness and Witnesses. Key-Distinctness just captures the fact that we interpret keys as themselves. The two axioms that make up Witnesses essentially capture our interpretation of 7 ,! as containment.
They tell us that facts about containment of principal expressions can be reduced to facts about principals. For example, the first one says that if p does not contain q, then there is a principal bound to q that is not bound to p. Although the exact statement of these axioms depends on our assumption that the set of keys is finite, somewhat analogous axioms would be required even if the set of keys were infinite.
Considering the two contentious axioms discussed by Abadi, we find that Converse of Globality is valid, as we observed earlier. The generalization of Linking considered In general, this is not valid, since our semantics ignores certificates stating p 1 7 ,! p 2 when p 1 is not a local name.
Thus, we avoid the "unreasonable" conclusions that can be drawn from these axioms. In particular, it does not follow in our logic that k cert DNS!! 7 ,! k DNS!! 7 ,! k. However, the reason it does not follow in LLNC is quite different from the reason it does not follow in Abadi's logic: since DNS!! is a global name, a certificate such as k cert DNS!! 7 ,! k has no impact on the interpretation of global names. This captures the intuition that k should not be trusted when making assertions about bindings not under its control. If we were willing to trust k on everything, then concluding that k is bound to DNS!! after k certifies that it is would not seem so unreasonable.
The following formula is also not valid in LLNC:
:k cert false^k cert DNS!! 7 ,! k DNS!! 7 ,! k:
(This formula corresponds to the one that we noted earlier is valid in Abadi's logic.) Failure to issue a certificate stating false has no more impact on global names than does any other behavior of k. Nor would a precondition asserting that the interpretation of k is non-empty validate the formula, since this is true in every world. We can in fact prove the following generalization of Abadi's Proposition 2.5, which provides a stronger statement of the safety of our logic than Abadi's result. Informally, Proposition 3.4 says that facts about global names are completely independent of facts about certificates; issuing certificates can have no impact on the global name assignment. As we observed earlier, the analogous result does not hold for Abadi's logic.
Name Resolution in LLNC
In this section, we show that LLNC captures REF2 exactly. Indeed, we show that it does so for several distinct semantic interpretations. Define the order on worlds by 0 ; c 0 ;c if 1. 0 g g for all global names g, and 2. c 0 k ck for all keys k. That is, w 0 w when w 0 contains more certificates than w and the bindings to global names in w are a subset of those in w 0 . The equivalence between (1) and (2) in this theorem tells us that REF2 is sound and complete with respect to key binding, according to the semantics of LLNC. That is, REF2k; ; c ; p yields k 0 iff p 7 ,! k 0 is forced to be true by the bindings of global names in and the certificates in c. Moreover, the equivalence between (2) and (3) (and also between (4) and (5)) shows that in any world where all the certificates in c have been issued (and perhaps others) p 7 ,! k 0 will be true in k's name space. These equivalences emphasize that we get the same conclusions whether we view the information given by ;c as representing all the bindings or view it as partial information (perhaps one principal's view) of all the bindings that have in fact been created.
It is instructive to understand why the formulas considered in Examples 2.3 and 2.4, which give conclusions in Abadi's logic beyond those derivable by REF2, are not valid in LLNC. It is easy to see why the formula k's Lampson's k 0 7 ,! k 0 from Example 2.3 (which, by Associativity and Transitivity, is equivalent to k's Lampson's k 0 7 ,! k 0 ) is not valid in LLNC. This is simply because Globality does not hold in general. Now consider the formula in Example 2.4. The proof that this is valid in Abadi's logic uses the Speaking-for axiom, which does not hold for us (if we replace says by cert). To see that it is not valid in LLNC, consider a world w = ;c containing only the certificates forced by the formulas (i.e., ck = fLampson 7 ,! k 1 ; Lampson 7 ,! k 2 g, ck 1 = fRon 7 ,! Rivestg, ck 2 = fRivest 7 ,! k 3 g). Then it is easy to see that w;k 6 j = k's Lampson's Ron 7 ,! k 3 , since k's Lampson's Ron w;lw;k = ; whereas k 3 w;lw;k = fk 3 g.
Logic Programming Implementations of Name Resolution Queries
The reader familiar with the theory of logic programming may have noted a close resemblance of the results and constructions of the preceding sections to the (now standard) fixpoint semantics for logic programs developed originally by van Emden and Kowalski [5] . Indeed, it is possible to translate our semantics into the framework of logic programming. In fact, we provide a translation that does not require the use of function symbols and thus produces a Datalog program, a restricted type of logic program that has significant computational advantages over unrestricted logic programs. Our translation allows us to take advantage of the significant body of research on the optimization of Datalog programs [13, 14] .
The idea is to translate queries to formulas in a firstorder language over a vocabulary V which consists of a constant symbol for each element in K G N and a ternary predicate symbol name. Intuitively, namex; y; z says that, in the local name space of key x, the name y is bound to key z.
Using name, for each principal expression p and pair of variables x; y, we define a first-order formula x;y p that, intuitively, corresponds to the assertion "y 2 p x ," by induction on the structure of p:
1. x;y p = namex; p; y when p 2 K G N. 2. x;y q's r = 9z x;z q^ z;y r, where z 6 = x; y.
Self
Abadi considers an extension of his logic obtained by adding a special basic principal expression Self, intended to represent SDSI's expression (ref:). (We remark that Self is essentially the same as I in the logic of naming considered in [7] .) Intuitively, Self denotes the current principal. The semantics given to Self by Abadi extends the definition of the set of principals associated with a principal expression by taking Self a = fag for each a 2 W . This suffices to validate the following axioms.
Identity :
Self's p 7 ,! p p 7 ,! Self's p p's Self 7 ,! p p 7 ,! p's Self These axioms very reasonably capture the intuitions that Self refers to the current principal.
However, not all consequences of this semantics for Self are so reasonable. For example, the following is valid under Abadi's semantics: k P says US 7 ,! Self^k P says US 7 ,! k V P k P says US says false _ Self 7 ,! k V P Interpreting k P as the key of the president of the US and k V P the key of the vice-president, this is clearly unreasonable. It should not follow from the fact the the president says that both he and the vice-president speak for the US that according to the president, either the US speaks nonsense or the vice president speaks for the president. Abadi's suggested semantics for Self works much better in the context of the logic LLNC. Suppose we extend this logic to include Self, and like Abadi, define Self k = fkg for keys k 2 K. This again validates the Identity axioms above. In addition, we get the following axiom: Self 7 ,! k , k 7 ,! Self where k is a key. However, we do not get a conclusion comparable to that for the example above. From k P cert US 7 ,! Self and k P cert US 7 ,! k V P it follows that US kP fk P ; k V P g. Thus, we have neither US kP = ; nor fk V P g US kP , which would be required to get a conclusion similar to that drawn by Abadi's logic.
Conclusions
We have introduced a logic LLNC for reasoning about SDSI's local name spaces and have argued that it has some significant advantages over Abadi's logic. Among other things, it provides a complete characterization of SDSI's REF2, has an elegant complete axiomatization, and its connections with Logic Programming lead to efficient implementations of many queries of interest.
We believe that some of the dimensions in which Abadi's logic differs from SDSI warrant further investigation. For example, under some sensible interpretations, the conclusions reached by Abadi's logic in Example 2.4 are quite reasonable. One such interpretation is that while local names may be bound to more than one key, they are intended to denote a single individual. If k knows that k 1 and k 2 are two keys used by the one individual Lampson, and Lampson uses k 1 to certify that his local name Ron is bound to the name Rivest, and also uses his key k 2 to certify that his local name Rivest is bound to k 3 , then it is very reasonable to conclude that k's Lampson's Ron is bound to k 3 . Another interpretation supporting this conclusion would be that says aggregates the certificates issued using a number of distinct keys (possibly belonging to distinct individuals) much in the way that the notion of distributed knowledge [6] from the literature on reasoning about knowledge aggregates the knowledge of a collection of agents. We believe that our semantic framework, which unlike Abadi's, makes the set of certificates issued explicit, provides an appropriate basis for the study of such issues.
Our semantic framework also lends itself to a number of generalizations, which we are currently exploring. These include reasoning about the beliefs of principals and reasoning about permission, authority, and delegation. We hope to report on this work shortly.
